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Abstract
Recent research in group cognition points towards the existence of collective cognitive competencies that transcend
individual group members’ cognitive competencies. Since rationality is a key cognitive competence for group decision
making, and group cognition emerges from the coordination of individual cognition during social interactions, this study
tests the extent to which collaborative and consultative decision rules impact the emergence of group rationality. Using
a set of decision tasks adapted from the heuristics and biases literature, we evaluate rationality as the extent to which
individual choices are aligned with a normative ideal. We further operationalize group rationality as cognitive synergy (the
extent to which collective rationality exceeds average or best individual rationality in the group), and we test the effect of
collaborative and consultative decision rules in a sample of 176 groups. Our results show that the collaborative decision rule
has superior synergic effects as compared to the consultative decision rule. The ninety one groups working in a collaborative
fashion made more rational choices (above and beyond the average rationality of their members) than the eighty five
groups working in a consultative fashion. Moreover, the groups using a collaborative decision rule were closer to the
rationality of their best member than groups using consultative decision rules. Nevertheless, on average groups did not
outperformed their best member. Therefore, our results reveal how decision rules prescribing interpersonal interactions
impact on the emergence of collective cognitive competencies. They also open potential venues for further research on the
emergence of collective rationality in human decision-making groups.
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Introduction
Small social groups are information processing systems [1,2]. As
such, cognitive science concepts and models have been extensively
used to explore the ways in which groups perform cognitive tasks,
such as decision making and problem solving. Recent empirical
evidence points toward the existence of collective intelligence, or
the ‘‘c’’ factor that explains collective performance of groups in
a variety of cognitive tasks [3]. Woolley and colleagues argue that
collective intelligence is a group property that transcends in-
dividual cognitive competencies and describes the group as a whole
[3]. Woodley and Bell [4] criticized the concept of collective
intelligence and argued that the procedure used to arrive at the
concept would rather reflect a common overarching factor of
collective cognitive performance, similar to the General Factor of
Personality (GFP). In other words, the ‘‘c’’ factor could be, in fact,
a group level-manifestation of the pro-social orientations (high
cooperativeness and low contentiousness) associated with the GFP
[4]. Either way, whether an emergent group property or group
level manifestation of GFP, a central issue related to collective
cognitive competencies is the extent to which they are open to
manipulation and change. In their concluding comments, Woolley
and colleagues call for research that elucidates the extent to which
collective intelligence or, more generally, collective cognitive
competencies can be increased via specific group interventions [3].
Curşeu and Schruijer [5] report a series of three studies in
which they show that simple normative interventions that
stimulate collaboration and participation foster group cognitive
complexity, increase group rationality, and improve decision
quality. Their second study, however, only compared decision-
making groups that received norms for achieving consensus with
groups that did not receive consensus norms [5]. As groups
without normative interventions could (in principle) use various
decision rules, it is important to better understand the way in
which specific normative interventions induce specific forms of
interpersonal interactions and ultimately influence the emergence
of collective rationality. Interpersonal interactions in decision-
making groups are often regulated through decision rules that
prescribe the ways in which individual contributions are to be
combined into collective outputs [6,7]. Two rules that have
received substantial attention in the literature on group decision
making [6,8,9] are consultative (one member collects inputs from
the other group members and makes the choice) and collaborative
(all members provide informational input used to achieve
consensus on the collective choice). Consequently, the aim of this
study is to test the extent to which the use of these two group
decision rules impacts on the emergence of group rationality.
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Collective Cognitive Competencies as Cognitive Synergy
The group cognition literature to date has mostly focused on
structural views of cognition and explored ways in which shared
individual representations impact on collective performance [1].
Groups draw on the cognitive resources of their members and,
therefore, have larger cognitive capacities than individuals alone
[10], yet little to no attention is shown to the emergence of
collective competencies in (human) decision-making groups [5].
We use the framework advanced by Hackman [11], and further
developed by Larson [12,13], to argue that collective cognitive
competencies reflect the synergetic cognitive processes in groups.
Effective synergetic processes occur when group performance
(collaborative performance) exceeds the performance achieved by
the simple, preprogrammed combination of standalone group
members’ efforts [12,13]. Hackman [11] defines group synergy as
a group level phenomenon that emerges from the interactions
among members and affects how well a group deals with task-
related demands and opportunities [11]. Larson [12,13] further
refined the concept and defined group synergy as an objective gain
in group performance as compared to summed individual
performances that is attributable to interpersonal interaction and
collaboration. Larson [12,13] also differentiates between strong
and weak group synergy. Groups achieve weak synergy when
collective performance is better than the average performance of
group members, and strong synergy when collective performance
exceeds the performance of the best performing individual in the
group [13]. We use this framework to describe emergent cognitive
competencies (in particular rationality) as group level (collective)
information processing competencies that emerge from interper-
sonal interactions and transcend individual cognitive competen-
cies.
Rationality has received considerable attention in the decision-
making literature and two major views on rationality currently co-
exist. On the one hand, ‘‘classical’’ rationality is related to a set of
cognitive competencies for decision-making that concur with
a normative ideal [14], and on the other hand, ecological
rationality explores the extent to which decisions are adapted to
the environment in which decision makers operate [15,16].
Consequently, two operationalizations of rational behavior exist.
According to the first one, decisions are rational to the extent to
which they conform to the norms of logic and mathematics [14],
and rational behavior is evaluated based on the principles of
consistency and coherence. According to the second one,
ecologically rational behavior is the result of adaptation and it
reflects accurate judgments about facts in the surrounding
environment [16].
In this paper we build on the ‘‘classic view’’ [14] of rationality
and define it as reduced sensitivity to decision-making biases and
heuristics and the general capability of making logically correct
choices [14]. Research on cognitive heuristics and biases has
identified various instances in which decision makers deviate from
a normative ideal and, as such, sensitivity to heuristics and biases
offers a reliable framework to evaluate individual and group
rationality [5,17]. Building on the intra-individual consistency
principle, Parker and Fischhoff [18] introduced the Adult De-
cision-Making Competence measure. Lack of sensitivity to biases
(answer consistency across various items) is used to evaluate
decision makers’ rationality and a decision maker is considered to
be rational if his/her answers adhere to the consistency principles
[18]. Decision makers can, in principle, be non-contradictory in
their preferences, but this does not mean their choices are logically
correct. In order to capture rationality as conformity to logic,
statistics and probability principles, we use a modified set of
decision tasks adapted from the general literature on heuristics and
biases. The decision-making tasks are modified in such a way that
participants have the chance to select from a multiple answer set
the normatively correct answer to the decision situation [5].
In terms of achieving synergy, if collective rationality in
a decision-making task exceeds the average group members’
rationality, the group achieves weak cognitive synergy. Strong
cognitive synergy reflects the objective gain in collective rationality
above and beyond the best (most rational) group member. Group
rationality is therefore, conceptualized as a group emergent
property (collective cognitive competence) generated by the
coordination of individual cognitive competencies (i.e., individual
rationality) during social interactions [5]. Research on decision
making in non-human groups has extensively addressed the
emergence of collective rationality [10,19,20] and has shown that
interactions among individual group members help the group
make rational choices, even if the individual group members do
not fully explore all available alternatives. In other words, although
composed of ‘‘irrational’’ members, animal groups can behave
rationally [6,19,20]. Collective rationality emerges from the
complex pattern of behaviors and interactions among individual
members, and it reflects a set of collective cognitive competencies
evolved from selection processes that operate at the group level
[20]. As opposed to human decision-making groups where
feedback on choices (and their possible consequences) is delayed
and often ambiguous, animal groups receive timely and un-
ambiguous feedback in situations with high adaptive value (often
directly linked to the survival of the group). It is therefore
reasonable to argue that the emergence of collective cognitive
competencies in human decision-making groups is explained by
qualitatively different mechanisms than the ones operating in
animal colonies. In line with the arguments of emergent cognition,
group rationality is expected to be influenced by the rationality of
individual members and the interaction processes induced by the
group decision rules [5].
Decision Rules and Rationality
Decision rules prescribe interpersonal interactions and influence
information sharing and integration during decision making.
Consultative and collaborative decision rules are among the most
common decision rules described in the group decision-making
literature and extensively used in (human) organizations [8], and
also documented in animal groups [6,19].
In consultative decisions, the group follows the decision of the
formal leader, and the role of the group members is simply to
provide informational input to the central decision maker.
Consultative decisions are argued to be more efficient, yet
information integration is rather limited as central decision makers
seem to prefer informational inputs that are similar or support
their own view and disregard those that diverge from their own
view [9]. Moreover, appointed leaders may overuse their power,
dominate the group, and ultimately reduce group communication
and participation [21]. We expect, therefore, that the potential for
information integration, and ultimately the emergence of collective
cognitive competencies, is impeded by the use of a consultative
decision rule. In collaborative settings, the group as a whole makes
the decision through consensus and members have equal
participation rights during the decision-making process. Such
decentralized decision making is conducive to the emergence of
rational behavior in ant colonies [19] and simulation studies show
that stable social groups benefit from collaborative rather than
follow-the-best decision rules [6]. To conclude, because members
have the chance to openly discuss and contribute with their unique
knowledge and expertise to decision making, collaborative settings
are expected to be conducive for the emergence of group
Decision Rules and Group Rationality
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rationality that ultimately transcends the rationality of individual
group members. Previous research supports this argument and
shows that group norms that stimulate collaboration and
participation create group synergy that ultimately leads to the
emergence of complex collective cognitive structures, better
decision quality, and higher group rationality [5]. Therefore, as
collaborative decision rules have more potential for knowledge
sharing and integration, we hypothesize that collaborative decision




Participants were asked to participate in a group decision
exercise as part of their course related activities, and they were
informed that the aim of the exercise is to illustrate the use of
various decision rules in group decision making. Verbal consent
was asked before the beginning of the class, and participants were
informed that their results would be used in scientific research. All
participants gave their verbal consent to participate in the study,
and because the decision exercise was part of regular curricular
activities, no supplementary consent was asked from the local
ethics committee. The main task involved filling out an individual
and a group questionnaire that did not involve any personal data
with the potential of embarrassing the participants. The study was
carried out in The Netherlands and according to the local ethical
guidelines, studies based on questionnaires that do not require any
personal data with the potential to embarrass the participants are
exempted from ethical committee approval. The experiment was
organized as a participative learning exercise (part of the
coursework) and no foreseeable risks, beyond those present in
routine daily life, were anticipated in this study. Nevertheless,
participants were informed that if they experienced distress
associated with their participation in the exercise, they should
notify the teachers immediately. All participants were debriefed
after the experiment as part of the reflection on the participative
learning exercise.
Participants and Procedure
Six-hundred-seventeen first year students enrolled in an in-
troductory course at a Dutch University with an average age of
19.15 years, 369 female and 248 male, participated in the study.
Participants were informed that they would take part in
a participative learning exercise aimed at illustrating the role of
decision rules on decision outcomes. The participative learning
exercise was part of regular curricular activities in the first course
related to organization studies in their curriculum, and organiza-
tional decision making was one of the topics taught in the course.
During the workshop, all participants first performed a set of
decision tasks. Then they were randomly assigned to 176 small
groups (average group size 3.49) and asked to redo the same
decision tasks as a group. We used two sets of instructions to
manipulate the decision rule. The ninety one groups in the
collaborative condition received the instruction to approach the
task by employing the method of group consensus, which means
that each group member must agree on the alternative that will be
selected by the group. In order to reach consensus in the
collaborative condition, group members were allowed to discuss
their opinions and views on the decision tasks with each other. The
eighty five groups in the consultative condition received the
instruction to approach the task by employing the method of
group leader, which means that each group member must provide
input to the appointed group leader who then decides on the
alternative that will be selected on behalf of the group. In this
condition, members were not allowed to discuss with other group
members, and the group leader was randomly appointed by the
teacher. After completing the group task, participants compared
the average individual scores with the collective score and were
debriefed about the study. The details of the manipulation were
also presented so students could reflect on the group dynamics
induced by the use of the two group decision rules. Along with this
debriefing, the results of the decision task were used to discuss
implications for group composition choices for different types of
organizations, as well as the implications for organizational
decision making. Data were collected across three academic years
in the same course, and in order to stick to the learning goals of the
workshops, both experimental conditions were used in each
workshop (students in each workshop were organized in small
groups having 3 to 4 members, and approximately half the groups
were placed in the consensus and half in the consultative decision
rule). Researchers kept a logbook in which all details of the study
across the three years were fully recorded.
Measures
Decision rationality was evaluated using ten decision-making tasks
adapted from the most frequently used experimental procedures in
the decision-making heuristics and biases literature, namely the
framing effect (2 items), representativeness bias (6 items), and
Ellsberg’s paradox (2 items). The items were adapted in such a way
that the normative correct alternative was presented among these
alternatives and, as a consequence, it is possible to compute
a rationality score reflecting the extent to which individual choices
deviate from a normative ideal. The following example illustrates
the way in which the classic example of the Asian Disease problem
[22] used to elicit framing effects was modeled in our rationality
measure: ‘‘Imagine that your country is preparing for the outbreak
of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.
Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
proposed: Program A and Program B. Assuming that the exact
scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are
known, which one will you choose as the most effective? (a) If
Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved; (b) If Program B
is adopted, there is a M probability that 600 people will be saved,
and O probability that no people will be saved; (c) Both programs
are equally effective and (d) I cannot decide.’’ An adapted item for
representativeness is: ‘‘You have the chance of buying a lottery
ticket. Suppose that on the first ticket the numbers are 7, 12, 18,
24, 33 and 45 and on the second ticket, the numbers listed are 1, 2,
3, 4, 5 and 6. Which one do you think has the highest chance of
being winner?(a) The first ticket; (b) The second ticket; (c) Both
tickets have equal chances of being a winner; (d)I cannot decide’’
and for Ellsberg’s paradox: ‘‘Suppose you have an urn with 90
balls, 30 yellow and 60 red or blue. You can draw one ball from
the urn and you have to bet on the color of the ball. If you
correctly guess the color of the ball, you can earn 100$. Which
color do you think has the highest probability of being drawn?
(a)Yellow; (b) Red; (c) Both have equal probability of being drawn;
(d) I cannot decide’’.
For each decision task, the normative correct answer (i.e. answer
‘‘c’’ in the examples above) was rated with one point while the
other (selected) answers received zero points, and the total score
for the rationality in decision making is computed by adding the
partial item scores. Low scores are indicative for decision makers
being sensitive towards decision-making biases and heuristics,
while high scores indicate a lower sensitivity to these biases and
heuristics. This way of evaluating rationality is aligned with the
classic conceptualization of rationality [14], and previous research
Decision Rules and Group Rationality
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shows that rationality scores correlate positively with the self
reported rational decision-making style [23]. Because we have
evaluated individual rationality as well as group rationality with
the same instrument, we can compute both weak as well as strong
synergy [13]. Weak cognitive synergy was computed by subtract-
ing the average individual rationality score from group rationality
(the results of the group decision task), while strong group synergy
was computed by subtracting the highest individual score from the
group score.
Given that group size and group diversity are important for
collective rationality [6,7], we used group size, average age
(computed as the average age of group members), age diversity
(computed as within group age standard deviation), and gender
diversity (computed using the Teachman index of diversity) as
control variables in our analyses [24]. The selection of control
variables is based on previous research, showing that group size is
likely to impact on group coordination and information exchange
[25]. Moreover, average within group age and gender diversity
influence interpersonal interaction and communication [26], and
gender diversity is also related to the pattern of interpersonal
interactions and the emergence of collective knowledge structures
[1].
Results
Means, standard deviation and correlation for the variables
included in the study are presented in Table 1.
To test our hypothesis, we ran two OLS regression analyses with
weak and strong cognitive synergy as dependent variables. As
controls, we used group size, average age, age and gender
diversity, as well as within group rationality mean and standard
deviation. We supplemented the regression with a bootstrapping
procedure to compute the 95% confidence intervals for the effect
sizes. The results of the regression analyses and the 95%
confidence intervals are presented in Table 2.
As the results indicate, the effect of the experimental manip-
ulation is significant in both regression analyses, and the 95%
confidence interval does not include zero. Therefore the hypoth-
esis that collaborative decision rules are superior to consultative
decision rules in fostering group rationality is fully supported.
Weak cognitive synergy is also positively and significantly
predicted by the within group standard deviation of the individual
rationality score and gender diversity. As the mean score was used
in the formula of weak cognitive synergy, a plausible explanation
for this positive effect is the association between the mean and
standard deviation [24]. Strong cognitive synergy has also
a negative association with the within group standard deviation
of individual rationality, as well as with the group size. Similar to
Woolley and colleagues [3], our results show that gender diversity
has a positive and significant association with both strong and
weak cognitive synergy. Figure 1 depicts the mean scores (62SD)
for weak and strong cognitive synergy for the two experimental
conditions. As shown in Figure 1, average strong cognitive synergy
values are negative for both experimental conditions, indicating
that on average the highest individual rationality score in the
group exceeds the group rationality score.
Discussion
Our results support the hypothesis that the collaborative
decision rule is superior to the consultative one in generating
both weak and strong cognitive synergy (operationalized as
collective rationality) in group decision making. These results
have three important implications for the literature on group
decision making. First, we extend the concept of rationality from
individuals to groups and show that groups have information
processing capabilities that transcend the individual capabilities of
their members. We challenge the view that groups accentuate their
members’ sensitivity to heuristics and biases, and show that
collaborative decision rules have the potential of creating weak
cognitive synergy. Our results are in line with insights from animal
decision making showing that complex information integration in
ant colonies prevents collective irrational behaviors [20]. Second,
we show that decision rules have the potential to influence the
emergence of these collective cognitive competencies. We,
therefore, add to the literature on collective cognitive competen-
cies [5,3] and show that decision rules that guide within group
interaction processes have the potential of influencing the
emergence of group cognitive competencies. Third, we distinguish
between weak and strong cognitive synergy, and we show that
although collaborative decision rules increase both strong and
weak cognitive synergy, in absolute terms they only generate weak
cognitive synergy. Because average strong synergy has negative
values in both experimental conditions, we can conclude that
although the groups that worked using the collaborative decision
rule achieve higher levels of strong synergy, group rationality is
actually lower than the highest individual rationality within the
group. This observation is aligned with simulation results of
decision-making in animal groups [6] showing that in single-shot
decisions, experts systematically outperform groups.
Table 1. Correlation Table with Descriptive Statistics (N = 176).
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Group size 3.49 .68 1
2. Age mean 19.15 1.37 .391**
3. Age SD 1.16 1.04 .203** .709**
4. Gender diversity a .36 .31 .191* .000 .009
5. Average IR 4.38 1.11 .160* .193* .193* -.002
6. IR SD 1.44 .73 .067 .131 .091 .040 .268**




a0 =male, 1 = female; SD – standard deviation; IR – individual rationality; numbered columns represent the variables specified on respective rows.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056454.t001
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Table 2. Results of the OLS Regression Analyses for Weak and Strong Cognitive Synergy (N = 176).
Weak cognitive synergy Strong cognitive synergy
B(SE) 95%BCaCI B(SE) 95%BCaCI
Control variablesa
Group size 2.074 (.16) [2.42;.28] 2.465 (.15)*** [2.84; 2.06]
Age mean .007 (.11) [2.20;.22] .020 (.19) [2.19;.25]
Age SD 2.067 (.13) [2.33;.20] 2.040 (.18) [2.30;.22]
Gender diversity b .817 (.32)** [.12; 1.54] .926 (.43)*** [.21; 1.66]
Average individual rationality .222 (.09)* [.03;.40] .237 (.14)** [.05;.41]
Individual rationality SD .283 (.14)* [.001;.54] 2.825 (.13)*** [21.19; 2.54]
Main effect manipulation
Experimental condition c .736 (.20)*** [.34; 1.12] .730 (.20)*** [.28; 1.18]
Rsq .16 .26





b0 =male, 1 = female,
c0 = consultative, 1 = collaborative; BCaCI – bias corrected accelerated confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056454.t002
Figure 1. Weak and strong cognitive synergy in consultative and collaborative decision making conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056454.g001
Decision Rules and Group Rationality
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An important question arises from these results, namely how
can groups develop strong synergy in its absolute sense? An
indicative answer could be offered by the study of Watson,
Michaelsen and Walt [27], showing that the group consensus
method repeatedly used over time stimulates strong synergy in
groups. Given the centrality of team development processes in
these results, the evolution of meta-cognitive processes (transactive
memory systems, cross-understanding and group meta-cognition)
may play an important role in the emergence of strong cognitive
synergy and the development of collective cognitive competencies.
Repeated interpersonal interactions facilitate meta-cognitive pro-
cesses (the way in which individual members reflect on how the
group performs a cognitive task), and thus generate more
opportunities for interpersonal and cognitive synergies in groups.
As transactive memory systems develop (shared awareness of who
knows what in the group), groups become more efficient in first
identifying and then using the specific resources of their best
member [6]. Therefore, future research should explore the
emergence and development of collective cognitive competencies
using longitudinal perspectives.
Group meta-cognition in decision making refers to shared
individual cognition about the way groups make decisions (the way
individual members think about the way groups process in-
formation and decide [28]) and are likely to impact on
interpersonal interaction and directed information search, which
ultimately enhance cognitive synergy in decision-making groups.
Group meta-cognitive processes could also shed more light on how
groups achieve strong synergy through the adjustment of the
complex behavioral algorithm that drives information integration
in social aggregates [20]. Future research could, for example,
explore the extent to which meta-cognition influences information
sharing in groups and the adjustment of individual communication
behavior in an attempt to achieve high quality decisions.
Cross-understanding is yet another possible path towards
achieving strong cognitive synergy in groups, as it reflects the
extent to which group members have accurate representations of
each other’s knowledge, skills and expertise [29]. Enhanced cross-
understanding could eventually increase the reliance on the most
knowledgeable group member and could also help the group to
overcome the detrimental effects of fragmentation. As indicated by
our results, within group standard deviation of individual
rationality (high standard deviation is indicative of group
fragmentation, see Harrison and Klein [24]) has a negative impact
on strong cognitive synergy. Cross-understanding might help
groups with high fragmentation (half of members scoring high on
rationality and half scoring low) better integrate subgroups and, as
a consequence, may stimulate strong synergy to emerge. Cross-
understanding is, therefore, one of the conditions under which
diversity in cognitive competencies trumps cognitive ability effects
in group decision-making (7).
Along with its contributions, our study also has several
limitations. First, the scoring procedure for the task used to
evaluate rationality could have been a boundary condition for
evaluating strong cognitive synergy in our study. In particular,
groups in which the best performing individual scored a ten on the
individual decision task (performed all decision tasks correctly)
could not achieve strong cognitive synergy. We performed
a robustness check and excluded from our analyses the groups
that had this particular configuration. The results of our analyses
did not change and therefore we can conclude that our
interpretations are accurate. Second, we adopted a particular
view of rationality (as conformity to a normative ideal) and did not
explore the emergence of ecological rationality. Reimer and
Katsikopoulos [30] explored the less-is-more heuristics in decision-
making groups and their results challenged the common assump-
tion that groups make better decisions when they have more
information (also supported by our collaborative decision rule),
and they show that the less-is-more heuristic holds in groups using
recognition based majority rule. It becomes highly relevant to
further explore the specific processes through which collective
ecological rationality emerges in (human) decision-making groups.
Third and finally, our results reflect the superiority of the
collaborative decision rule, yet we did not explicitly address the
way interpersonal interactions (i.e., social network structure)
influence the emergence of collective rationality. According to
simulation studies [31,32] interpersonal interaction is a key
element for the emergence of collective rationality. Therefore,
future research should tap into the relationship between commu-
nication structure and emergence of collective cognition.
Conclusions
The results presented in this paper provide initial empirical
evidence for the effect of decision rules on group rationality. We
show that the collaborative decision making context is conducive
to the emergence of group rationality, conceptualized as a collec-
tive cognitive competence of making choices aligned with
a normative ideal. Weak and strong cognitive synergy are used
to operationalize group rationality as the gain in rationality (over
the average within group individual rationality and the most
rational member of the group) attributed to interpersonal
interactions induced by decision rules. As rationality of choice is
an important asset in managerial decisions, our results have
important implications for the management of decision- making
groups in organizations.
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